What policies have most constrained the proliferation of nuclear weapons over the last sixty years? Will they continue to do so in the future?
research suggests that the answer is not technology or industrial limitations, not export controls or information secrecy, and probably not intelligence coupled with counterproliferation action: none of these would have been able to counter the numerous clandestine-capable, indigenous nuclear weapon capabilities described herein. Organizational capability remains a constraint, and policymakers could, in principle, work to reduce the ability of governments to organize labor and domestic resources; but such actions are generally inimical to international peace and stability writ large. If there are no other supply-side constraints, the situation described here leaves policymakers having to look beyond supply-side controls, toward the cultural, normative, and political organization of the world, in search of ways to reduce the demand for nuclear weapons-an approach that has been largely neglected over the last sixty years. This is a difªcult and politically expensive proposition, but it may be the only approach able to endure technological change.
Birth and Death of Supply Side Constraints
When reports of the ªrst Soviet nuclear weapon test arrived at the White House, President Harry Truman and members of his cabinet were so doubtful of Soviet capabilities that they rejected the reports on the grounds that a Soviet weapon was impossible. One ofªcial later reported that he believed the radioisotope fallout that revealed the Soviet test was actually produced by a nuclear-reactor accident, a more likely Soviet achievement. 5 U.S. intelligence analysts were similarly shocked in 1964 when they discovered that China had tested a nuclear weapon made from enriched uranium. The uranium path was understood to be more difªcult than that of plutonium, and the production of either was thought to be well beyond China's capabilities. In its report following China's ªrst test, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confessed that China had "a much more ambitious advanced-weapons program than we had earlier thought possible." 6 Despite these and other sobering experiences, technology is still seen as an important barrier to proliferation. For decades, the CIA based its proliferation assessments not on motivations, but on forecasts of how long it would take a advanced nations to some of the most technically indigent. 12 Scholars tend to agree that these transfers are of two major types: civil cooperation that enables later proliferation and cases of intentional proliferation assistance. 13 While the technology-transfer model is rooted in historical evidence, all that has been established in the literature is that technology transfers took place. At times those transfers have been helpful, but it is often presumed that transfers were important, if not essential, to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, yet scant evidence is provided.
With time, the necessity of technology transfer must be questioned simply because information and technology that were once esoteric gradually become mainstream. In parallel, the utility of transfers for proliferation is apt to decline as motivations shift from the strategic (e.g., Soviet proliferation to China, or Pakistani proliferation to North Korea) to the pecuniary (e.g., commercial transfers or black markets). The latter motivation has tended to produce problematic outcomes for aspiring proliferators. Consider, for example, Brazil's purchase of jet-nozzle enrichment technology from Germany. Brazil squandered perhaps as much as $100 million and half a decade before realizing that the nozzle was a dud. 14 In some more recent instances, such as Iraq's nuclear weapon program, ªnancially motivated transfers were helpful but arguably not necessary. For others, including some of the most oft-cited cases such as Pakistan, Iran, and even Libya, I ªnd evidence to suggest that transfers set back these programs relative to what they might have accomplished acting alone.
The most difªcult technological step in building nuclear weapons is the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. If HEU can be obtained, then there are essentially no additional technologies needed to make a bomb. Unlike plutonium, HEU can be used in both implosion-and gun-type nuclear weapons. The latter type is a simple design that is extremely robust to manufacturing defects and needs no exotic parts, triggers, fuses, or materi-The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes 43 12. Belief in the centrality of foreign assistance is also evident in U.S. government documents. For example, National Intelligence Estimate NIE-4-66 predicted that Pakistan, Egypt, and South Africa were likely nuclear weapon aspirants, but would all require "substantial outside help." Central Intelligence Agency, "The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation," National Intelligence Estimate 4-66, January 20, 1966, National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-12.pdf. 13. For civil cooperation, see Harold A. als. Such a weapon can be easily and quickly made, and conªdently ªelded without testing. Gun-type bombs can even be made small enough to ªt onto missiles. 15 Therefore, to demonstrate the effective absence of supply-side constraints, it would be sufªcient to show that there exists a way to make HEU that is accessible to most states, that is well known, and that states could be conªdent of executing with a high chance of success. Several such paths now exist, most using the gas centrifuge as the principal technology. 16 
Centrifuges as a Proliferation Technology
Many states already regard the centrifuge as a good proliferation pathway. Since 1975, seven of eight nuclear weapon aspirants have pursued centrifuges. 17 Four-Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, and Iran-made centrifuges a central focus of their programs. Furthermore, three of these states began exploring centrifuges prior to the receipt of any foreign assistance; hence the choice of centrifuges was not predicated on the promise of outside help. A ªfth state, North Korea, recently replaced its long-standing plutonium capability with a centrifuge capability. A sixth, South Africa, also tried to upgrade from its original vortex technology to centrifuges, but regime change intervened. Only one state, Syria, made better progress with plutonium. Nonetheless, Syria was interested in centrifuge technology, but it never went forward for reasons that are still unknown. 18 Centrifuges are even more popular as a latent nuclear International Security 38:4 44 15. Although the ªrst gun-type weapon (Little Boy) was heavy and bulky, this reºected a conservative design rather than necessity. Starting in 1952, the United States deployed more than 1,200 W33 gun-type warheads, each of which had a maximum yield of 40 kilotons, an exterior diameter of eight inches, and weighed about the same as the advanced W80 thermonuclear warhead (ϳ114 kilograms). Such a weapon could be placed on a missile without difªculty. See Thomas 17. The eight aspirants are Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, Syria, and Taiwan; only Taiwan has not pursued centrifuges. Argentina and Brazil are assumed to have pursued latent nuclear weapon capabilities but not to have decided to build a bomb, therefore they are not counted. If following the alternative interpretation in which Argentina and Brazil are categorized as having weapon programs, the reader should add one centrifuge case (Brazil) and one noncentrifuge case (Argentina) to the count. 18. In interviews, anonymous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ofªcials reported that Syria had communicated multiple times with the A.Q. Khan network on the matter. See also weapon capability. In total, at least twenty countries have developed or acquired centrifuges: Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Libya, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, the Soviet Union/Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 19 Despite the widespread pursuit of centrifuges, many scholars regard the centrifuge as "one of the most complicated technical challenges in the world." 20 Panels as august as the National Academy of Sciences have written-albeit without performing a technical study-that "all enrichment techniques [including centrifuges] demand sophisticated technology in large and expensive facilities." 21 Matthew Fuhrmann and Gordon Corera independently have described centrifuge technology as "sophisticated." 22 In 2004, Jonathan Pollack and Mitchell Reiss went so far as to predict that centrifuge technology was probably beyond the capability of South Korea. 23 None of these scholars evaluated the technical requirements of the centrifuge; rather, their statements reºect a received wisdom pervasive in the nonproliferation community.
Technical experts have rarely been as conªdent that the indigenous development of centrifuges would be as insurmountably difªcult. In the early 1960s-about one year after a prototype gas centrifuge of the modern variety was built and tested in the United States-the chairman of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority (U.K. AEA), Lord Plowden, warned his counterpart, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman John McCone, that the centrifuge might lead to the widespread acquisition of nuclear weapons. 24 Plowden's warning was effective. In March 1960, centrifuges were at the front of McCone's mind, and he discussed his concerns with President Dwight Eisenhower during the negotiations of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. 25 In April 1960, a ªfty-four-page study of the centrifuge problem was prepared jointly by the AEC directors of classiªcation, international affairs, and research. 26 It cited, inter alia, a study that the AEC commissioned from the General Electric Company-the ªrm that had built gas centrifuges for the Manhattan Projectwhich concluded that a plant capable of producing twenty nuclear weapons per year could be built using simple centrifuges for $17 million in two to three years, and that this capability was already available to twenty or thirty countries. 27 Another study undertaken in 1960 by Union Carbide, the ªrm then operating the gaseous diffusion plant at Oak Ridge, concluded that even the technically indigent nations of Egypt and Cuba could build a centrifuge plant in about eight years. 28 The authors of the AEC report concluded, "The centrifuge, as compared with the reactor route, studied by the Hanford Operations Ofªce, would be the easier to pursue." 29 By the fall of 1960, concern about centrifuges had spread beyond the executive branch of the United States to select individuals in Congress. At the third 1960 presidential debate, Senator John F. Kennedy famously said, "There are indications, because of new inventions, that ten, ªfteen, or twenty nations will have a nuclear capacity-including Red China-by the end of the presidential ofªce in 1964." 30 The only relevant invention at that time was the modern gas centrifuge, a prototype of which had been demonstrated earlier that year at the University of Virginia. At the close of 1960, AEC Chairman McCone penned a cautionary note to the public that read, "Do not minimize the potential importance of this process. There is no doubt in my mind it will introduce an additional complicating factor in the problems of nuclear arms among nations and our quest for controlled disarmament." 31 Although these assessments were well informed by a prototype program and industrial ªrms experienced with similar centrifuge engineering, there had yet to be a real test that simulated the conditions of a neophyte proliferator. Both the United States and the United Kingdom decided to commission just such a test in separate de novo development programs, both of which are described later in this article. The concluding reports, now partly declassiªed, conªrmed what the earlier General Electric, Hanford, and Union Carbide studies had predicted: that even in the 1960s it was feasible for countries with no prior experience, "that possess relatively little technical skills and which have relatively little industrial activity," to produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons by means of a small centrifuge plant. 32 Technical capability does not by itself establish proliferation potential. If there is a high chance that a proliferator might be caught in the act of proliferation and subjected to international censure, then the state could be deterred from trying. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are designed to do just this. Indeed, historically most nuclear weapon programs were detected before the actual achievement of a weapon. 33 Most gas centrifuge programs, however, were not. Some technologies, such as the gas centrifuge, require only a modest industrial footprint and are capable of producing ªssile materials for weapons without generating signatures that might reveal the existence of a program. Such programs have escaped detection by human, signals, and technical intelligence for decades at a time.
A ªnal consideration is the organizational capabilities of states. Although centrifuges may be within the reach of small states, the ability of governments to organize a weapons program has been surprisingly limited. Such organizational constraints may be the only supply-side limitation still operational. Sur- prisingly, however, I ªnd that foreign assistance and technology transfers have not been useful in overcoming these limitations. History shows multiple ways in which foreign assistance has been counterproductive: the supplied technology has been poor; the information provided has been incomplete; and programs have been directed toward unnecessary complications that strain the indigenous resources of the state. In general, ªnancially motivated foreign agents have private objectives that differ from the proliferator's strategic objectives and, historically, this has tended to exacerbate organizational limitations. Additionally, foreign assistance has increased signiªcantly the probability that a weapons program will be detected by an intelligence service and, as a consequence, subjected to sanctions, sabotage, or other counterproliferation action. While the utility of foreign assistance has been mixed, there is almost no evidence to indicate that foreign assistance with centrifuges has been critical.
proliferation dynamics
The centrifuge raised alarm in the early 1960s, not because it could make ªssile material for nuclear weapons-many other technologies including commonplace nuclear reactors could do that-but because centrifuges could do it on a small scale, and with almost no chance of detection. 34 That meant a state could rely on the clandestine nature of the plant to protect it from international censure rather than try to force its way past safeguards. This enabled a new sort of proliferation where states unable or unwilling to pursue billion-dollar, industrial-scale nuclear facilities could have access to the bomb, too.
A secret program is always at risk of detection, but the historical record suggests the risk might be low. To begin with, centrifuge facilities are nearly impossible to detect by technical means (e.g., measurement and geospatial intelligence) because they do not produce signatures that would reveal their existence at signiªcant distances. A clandestine plant can be housed in a building with no identifying features that would easily escape detection by visual satellite imaging. 35 The plant's energy consumption would be low and, unlike International Security 38:4 48 34. That this was speciªcally the concern is evident in McCone, "Appendix 20"; and Luedecke, "Memorandum to John McCone et al." 35. The most distinctive feature of centrifuge plants is their power lines, but a small plant does not need an unusual level of service. A 5,000 SWU/year plant populated with 1 SWU/year machines might draw approximately 100 kilowatts of electrical power if the machines were as energy inefªcient as the primitive prototype built at the University of Virginia in 1960, and if 100 percent were added as an overhead factor (modern Urenco centrifuges with overhead would use about one-third this amount of energy). A typical power substation provides on the order of 10 megavolt-amps, 100 times the power required for the inefªcient centrifuge plant. Large diesel-or natural-gas-fueled industrial standby generators can be rated as high as 100,000-200,000 kWe, a thousand times the required power level. Thus, power lines need not be distinct, and are not even necessary. See Gernot Zippe, "The Development of Short Bowl Ultracentrifuges," No. ORO-315 a nuclear reactor or gaseous diffusion plant, could not be identiªed with thermal-infrared imaging. 36 Centrifuge plants process uranium in the form of uranium hexaºuoride, a gaseous compound. The gas is maintained at pressures below atmospheric, so any leaks in the plumbing tend to allow air into the system, rather than uranium to leak out. As a consequence, the total uranium released to the environment is typically small to the point of being undetectable. 37 A fourth kind of signature, the free-space electromagnetic emanations (radio signals) radiating from centrifuge motors, almost entirely cancel each other out because centrifuges utilize three-phase power, and what remains is so weak that it is physically impossible to detect at meaningful distances. 38 A ªfth signature would be ºuctuations induced on power lines from electronic circuits. These are signiªcant, but can be easily ªltered out using industry standard practices or simply avoided by using a diesel-or natural-gas fueled generator to power the plant. 39 Human and signals intelligence depend on the operational and programmatic security of a covert program. Large programs, those dependent on foreign entities, and those that depend on specialized tools, materials, or equipment, are especially vulnerable to monitoring. Centrifuge programs are remarkably small in comparison to other proliferation routes, and the prospects for detection are correspondingly smaller. Advanced centrifuges require specialized tools and materials, and procurements of these specialized inputs have led to detections. Simple but adequate centrifuges can be built without
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(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Division of Engineering Physics, Research Laboratories for the Engineering Sciences, July 1960); and Urenco, "Enrichment Brochure," ver. 4 (Bells Hill, U.K.: Urenco, March 22, 2005). 36. A 5,000-machine plant could easily ªt into a building 75 meters per side, resulting in an energy density of about 56,000 BTU/square foot/year, on par with a typical warehouse or storage facility and about half the average use for a retail outlet or one-fourth the power density used by a foodprocessing facility or a single-story hospital. 37. The most signiªcant chemical efºuent is the process gas, uranium hexaºuoride. Measurements from existing centrifuge plants and uranium hexaºuoride production facilities suggest the releases are far too small to be detectable at signiªcant distances. The installation of high efªciency particulate air ªlters could further reduce these releases by three to ªve orders of magnitude. See R. Scott Kemp, "Source Terms for Routine UF 6 these, however, using only resources completely within the domestic control of most countries.
The historical record helps illustrate the extent to which centrifuge programs have avoided detection in the past. The most dramatic case of nondetection is that of the Soviet Union-a country under the most intense Western scrutiny that resources would allow. The Soviet Union began operating its ªrst largescale centrifuge plant in 1957 and expanded by adding plants every few years thereafter. 40 The United States had known since at least January 1955 that the Soviet Union had been developing experimental centrifuges, but the intelligence community saw no evidence that the technology had been developed past the laboratory stage. 41 Many years later, satellite reconnaissance showed that older gaseous diffusion plants were being shut down and disassembled, but the intelligence community still lacked credible evidence that the Soviets were replacing these with centrifuge plants. As such, the United States and the United Kingdom both assessed that the Soviet Union was reducing its enrichment enterprise. 42 By 1970, some analysts felt that the Soviets must have deployed centrifuges, despite the absence of evidence-but these individuals were in the minority, and ofªcial assessments remained unchanged. 43 After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia disclosed to the United States that it had centrifuge plants, which had been operating undetected for thirty-four years, and which constituted at that time the largest centrifuge program in the world by almost a factor of ten. 44 Failure to assess correctly the existence of Russian capacity was about 20,000,000 kg-SWU/year, compared to about 2,500,000 kg-SWU/year the Soviet centrifuge program led to errors in U.S. estimates for the amount of highly enriched uranium produced by the Soviet Union, and accordingly the number of possible warheads. 45 China is a similar case. In 1964, the United States was surprised when it learned from atmospheric sampling that China made its ªrst nuclear weapon using highly enriched uranium. The following National Intelligence Estimate of China's program, endorsed by the entire the U.S. intelligence community, stated, "The gas centrifuge process has never been developed beyond the experimental stage in the Free World. There is no persuasive evidence that the Soviets have produced gas centrifuges in signiªcant numbers and none that they have given any to the Chinese. We do not believe the Chinese have attained the manufacturing capability and technology required for domestic production of the necessary large numbers of suitable centrifuges." 46 The statement was clearly in error about the Soviet program, but it also underestimated the Chinese capability. The intelligence community had correctly assessed that China's uranium had been partly enriched at a gaseous diffusion plant in Lanchou, and also assessed that "the Lanchou facility was not responsible for producing the U-235 in CHIC-l by the gaseous diffusion process alone but that another process was also involved." 47 The intelligence community, lacking information about the unidentiªed second process, assumed that it was probably electromagnetic isotope separation-mirroring what the United States had done during the Manhattan Project. The Chinese nuclear establishment, however, has since revealed that, at the time of the 1964 test, China was well on its way to a second-or third-generation centrifuge. An experimental centrifuge program had been established at China's Tsinghua University in 1958, and the ªrst successful separation of isotopes by centrifuge achieved in 1961, three years prior to China's ªrst nuclear test. Work on a secondgeneration machine started in 1962, two years prior to the test. 48 2. According to one source, the transition from gaseous diffusion to gas centrifuge reduced energy consumption by a factor of 8.2 and increased overall output by a factor of 2.4. See Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 603, n. 119. 46. Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program," January 27, 1965, pp. 20-21, https://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/frus_30_077.htm. 47. Ibid., p. 6. 48. Work was also performed at the former Shanghai Light-Bulb Factory, among other places. Remarks on the program from collected memoirs suggest the ªrst centrifuge might have been a an Australian news source, China had "perfected" the centrifuge at some point in the mid-1960s, and by April 1967 was preparing to replace parts of its gaseous diffusion plant with centrifuges. 49 In 1970, a second human source revealed to the CIA that he knew that the Soviet Union had transferred centrifuge "know-how" to the Chinese back in 1957 and, further, that the Soviet Union was conªdent that China had produced weapon-quantities of HEU through the centrifuge process alone. 50 The intelligence world is full of rumors, though, and without more reliable evidence, the CIA concluded, "Analysis of all available data has produced no evidence of a centrifuge plant [in China] because there are no speciªc identifying characteristics of a centrifuge plant." 51 The Soviet and Chinese programs existed in tightly controlled societies with few foreign connections or strong security cultures, and in an era before modern signals intelligence. The paucity of reliable signals might be expected. Future proliferation is apt to have a different character, perhaps more similar to the programs of Pakistan, South Africa, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. Five of these six programs were detected before they reached maturity, and on the surface lend support to the view that improved human access, and modern signals intelligence, can do much to uncover a clandestine program. A detailed review of these programs argues against this, however. It seems the A.Q. Khan proliferation network played a unique role in revealing these programs. Programs that did not depend on Khan (e.g., Iraq) were not detected. 52 Khan's role in revealing clandestine programs is ªrst demonstrated with his own centrifuge effort in Pakistan. Although other centrifuge options were available, Khan decided to pursue a centrifuge design that required advanced materials and manufacturing capabilities that were not readily available inside Pakistan in 1975. According to an investigation by the Dutch government, it was this decision that led to Pakistan's program being detected. The ªrst indication came in August 1975, when Pakistan approached a Dutch ªrm for information pertaining to power supplies for centrifuge motors. 53 54 Because of the dual-use nature of these items, however, the evidence was too ambiguous to conclude that Pakistan was interested in centrifuges. 55 It was not until September 1975, when Pakistan placed an order with a French ªrm named Metalimphy, for a product not listed in its catalog, and which had been custom designed for the European Urenco centrifuge program, that a conclusive link emerged between Pakistan's procurement activities and its centrifuge ambitions. 56 After the detection of Pakistan's program, the intelligence community began to watch Pakistan's procurement network. 57 When Khan and his associates later transferred centrifuge technology to Iran, Libya, South Africa, and North Korea, some of these activities were observed. 58 Court documents and an IAEA source, for example, report that one of Khan's suppliers, Gotthard Lerch, was independently attempting to sell centrifuge technology to South Africa. Surveillance of Lerch tipped off U.S. intelligence about South Africa's centrifuge pursuits, which led to an early termination of its program. 59 Similarly, initial suspicions about North Korea's possible centrifuge program were based on its interactions with A.Q. Khan, although North Korea later ºatly admitted that it had centrifuge ambitions. 60 Thus, had these countries not relied on Khan, their programs might not have been detected in the way that they were.
The 2005 report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction reviewed these early successes in the context of the Libyan case, and concluded that a "disproportionately large volume" of U.S. intelligence was related to procurement activities, whereas little to no information had been obtained about internal activities. 61 It also noted that the Libyan centrifuge program was detected 63 Over the decades, a few dozen of North Korea's procurements were observed in a scattershot fashion. 64 Lacking a coherent picture, the intelligence community wrongly assessed that North Korea had an interest in centrifuges, maybe a development program, but not a capability. 65 It was a surprise when North Korea revealed in 2010 that it had a full-scale, modern centrifuge plant in Yongbyon.
In sum, the historical record suggests that the probability of detecting a centrifuge program can be signiªcant when states rely on watched foreign sources of specialized technology or well-known proliferators. The chances of detection will be lower, but perhaps adequate, if states depend on unwatched foreign providers, or mask their procurements with front companies, as North Korea did. Advances in signals intelligence might improve upon past performance. Despite all this, the use of foreign technology and materials is probably not necessary for a centrifuge program, and if states turn inward, the chances of detection might be signiªcantly reduced. This may be why the 2005 intelligence commission concluded, "It is apparent to us that the [Intelligence] Community is not well-postured to replicate such success." 66 For states that built a centrifuge capability indigenously, the probability of timely detection has been approximately zero. In no case, including the most contemporary instance of North Korea's full-scale centrifuge plant, has intelligence uncovered an indigenous program. 67 This is not surprising given the lack of technical indicators that can reliably ªnd a clandestine plant, or even conªrm the nature of a suspect one. 68 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that a small centrifuge program lends itself to organizational isolation. The prospect for recruiting defectors is diminished compared to larger, more traditional nuclear programs, which require a cadre of easily identiªed engineers with nuclear-speciªc expertise.
Finally, it is worth noting that, if a covert centrifuge program is detected, a state can argue that the program is intended for peaceful purposes, shifting its proliferation strategy from a clandestine route to a more overt strategy. Iran has done this with some success, and although suspicions will be high, sympathy, plausible deniability, and a desire of nonnuclear weapon states to keep their own nuclear weapon options open may help abate international pressure to terminate the centrifuge program absent conclusive evidence of weapon intent. Unlike dedicated plutonium-production programs, the ambiguity of dual-use centrifuges helps states to secure a weapon option even under international scrutiny.
The Development of Centrifuge Technology by Independent Programs
The history of centrifuge development is signiªcant: at least twenty countries have developed or obtained a centrifuge capability. Five depended critically on illicit foreign assistance. 69 Two more are too poorly documented to tell. 70 The remaining thirteen, which brought their programs to a successful conclusion without depending on the black market, form a basis for assessing what states can do on their own. 71 Most of the indigenous programs on record were started in the 1960s and early 1970s-prior to the mainstream availability of computer-aided design, globalized industrial manufacturing, or rapid prototyping technologies. This was also a time when the centrifuge was still largely a mystery and centri- fuge-speciªc technical information was scarce and hard to come by. Today, by comparison, there are hundreds of articles on centrifuge theory and design, including several review articles able to direct engineers to the relevant sub-literatures. 72 The programs described below, with the possible exception of Brazil, could be characterized as small, exploratory efforts with limited resources. All were started out of curiosity and a sense that the technology could be importantperhaps equally important for energy as for national security-but the technology was not needed for any immediate purpose. All the programs pursued "subcritical centrifuges," an especially simple design developed a decade earlier in the Soviet Union, and from which all modern centrifuges are now derived. In some sense, these resource-poor programs, based on antiquated 1950s' Soviet technology and built with 1960s' machine tools, might be analogous to future proliferation programs in the developing world. Despite the simplicity, the average development time, measured over programs with known dates, was only twenty-four months (with a standard deviation of eleven months). 73 To get a sense of the character of these programs, the level of resources utilized, the trials experienced, and the achievements made, I review the four most indigenous programs in detail here. The program time lines for the other ten are summarized in ªgure 1. 1970s, and were likely the driving force behind the centrifuge programs of nine other nations that began programs during the same period, all of which were successful.
None of the individuals involved with the U.S. program had interacted with Zippe before or during the development phase, nor did the engineers have any prior experience with centrifuges or similar high-speed rotating machinery. 76 This isolation and inexperience suggests that there was little to no transfer of tacit knowledge. Four of the eventual ªfteen engineers and technicians had prior experience with gaseous diffusion, which, though not germane to the design of centrifuges, would have improved access to, and handling of, uranium. This sort of experience, however, is most relevant to the production and operating phases for a centrifuge plant; very little relates to centrifuge engineering, and that which does is today widely available in the public domain because of the requirements of the commercial nuclear industry.
In 1960, the engineers did not have access to computer-controlled machines or computer-aided design tools. The early U.S. centrifuges were machined by hand and required no more tooling than what might be available today in a high-school machine shop. 77 Problems were diagnosed by trial and error and by the repeated manufacture of slightly varied prototypes-an effort that today can be greatly reduced by modeling using commercially available software packages. Despite the trial-and-error approach, progress was rapid. The program began with only four engineers. Within ªve months, these four individuals accomplished all the design and testing needed to build the ªrst prototype. 78 During months six through nine, the program was expanded from four to ªfteen. Most of these were relatively inexperienced technicians with only undergraduate degrees. The program was split into two teams: some worked on building a more advanced centrifuge, while the others began producing copies of the original design in order to experiment with cascades. 79 In the tenth month, the program had its ªrst and only major stumble. Some of the early centrifuges began vibrating, which caused them to self-destruct. The group had no computers capable of analyzing the cause of the vibrations; they even lacked a correct mathematical theory of vibration. 80 A methodical study had to be carried out, and the vibration problem was soon rectiªed. By the end of month ªfteen, the group was able to reliably build smooth-running centrifuges and operate them in a cascade that performed at 80 percent of the maximum possible efªciency-adequate for proliferation purposes. 81
united kingdom
The British centrifuge program paralleled the U.S. program, and was almost identical in size and duration. It began one month prior to the U.S. program and was also based on Zippe's technical reports. 82 The group also grew to ªfteen persons: ten worked on mechanics and gas dynamics at Capenhurst; two at Harwell worked on theory; and three at Culcheth did experiments on metallurgy and novel materials. 83 In June 1961, the British group ran into the vibration problem just as the United States later did, but the problem was apparently solved by the end of 1961 when the program was transferred from the research division to the production division of the U.K. AEA. 84 The British program diverges from the track of the U.S. program in that-unlike the United States, which had made a large postwar investment in gaseous diffusion plants and had no motivation to replace them-the British wartime diffusion plant was failing and needed replacing. The British centrifuge team thus moved quickly toward a production machine in hopes of outcompeting the diffusion group. 85 They focused on building machines that had reasonably good performance and that would last ten to twenty years, long enough to pay off the capital investment. They succeeded in building a prototype that exceeded the requirements of a proliferation-scale program within ªfteen months-the same time period as the U.S. program.
The British program also provides a view of what simple mass production might look like. Because of the need to demonstrate a working plant at an early date, the British program bootstrapped the mass production of centrifuges by hiring unskilled laborers to make and assemble centrifuge parts in a production line. According to interviews with one British engineer who worked on the United Kingdom's ªrst pilot cascade, approximately 2,000 machines were assembled in about one year. 86 australia Australia's centrifuge program started in 1965. The ªrst machine built was a subcritical centrifuge, just like the ones built in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 87 None of the engineers involved had any prior experience with isotope separation, and no research on centrifuges had been done at Australian universities or other national institutions. The program was remarkably small: a team initially numbering three, and never exceeding six persons, began with nothing but a library of publicly available documents. Despite the program's tiny size and modest resources, Australia was operating a small cascade of proliferation-capable centrifuges in less than six years. 88 This is the slowest program of independent development on record. the navy and began in earnest in early 1979. Individuals involved with the program estimate that it had reached ten to twenty persons by 1980. 89 After that, the program grew rapidly, reaching perhaps as many as ªfty individuals by the time it had successfully enriched "macroscopic" amounts of uranium around the spring of 1982. 90 This makes Brazil's program one of the largest on record, but it was also organized as a major military undertaking and took many wrong turns along the way. Brazil's ªrst centrifuge rotors were made from carbon steel, a material that corrodes when exposed to uranium hexaºuoride. A second model was based on stainless steel, which, though noncorroding, introduces extra complications relative to aluminum because of its heavy weight and low strength-to-weight ratio. Such a centrifuge could not be practically used even for a crude program. Brazil then moved to maraging steel, a highly specialized steel capable of good performance, but one that is also complicated to use because of its metallurgy and heavy weight. Brazil did not at the time produce this special steel indigenously, so it had to develop a domestic production capability ªrst. 91 These dead-ends and delays could have been avoided if Brazil had had access to any of the several books and articles that discuss the suitability of materials, and which are now available in the public domain. Nonetheless, Brazil was successful in overcoming these hurdles in about three years.
Similar such programs were replicated in the Netherlands, Germany, Israel, France, China, Sweden, Italy, India and Japan. The programmatic time lines of these programs are shown in ªgure 1. 92 Every centrifuge program described above was engaged in the design of subcritical centrifuges-sometimes called short-bowl, Zippe-type, or Soviettype centrifuges. The rotating part of subcritical centrifuge is typically no more than about a half-meter tall. This stands in contrast to "supercritical" centrifuges seen in commercial enrichment facilities, which are typically several meters tall. 93 The labels "subcritical" and "supercritical" refer to the absence or The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes 61 89. Orpet Peixoto, who was personally involved in the program, estimated ªfteen to twenty individuals. José Goldemberg estimated ten. Author interview with Peixoto, September 13, 2011; and author email interview with José Goldemberg, August 2, 2009. 90. Author interview with Peixoto. 91. Ibid. According to Peixoto, Brazil's steel producers resisted because there was no commercial market for the steel. Based on the date when the ªrst prototypes were built with imported steel (1982), and when the ªrst cascades were built with domestic steel (1985) , the creation of a domestic maraging steel capability took less than four years. 92. All data based on open source information. The time to develop a proliferation-capable design is shown in black. Arrows on a timeline boundary indicate a date may be off by more than six months. 93. Subcritical centrifuges will typically provide between 0.5 and 1 kg-SWU per centrifuge per year. For context, about 5,000 kg-SWU are needed to make a ªrst-generation implosion-type nuclear weapon. For a technical discussion of the differences between subcritical and supercritical centrifuges, see Whitley, "Review of the Gas Centrifuge until 1962." presence of certain vibrational resonances that render the engineering of the centrifuges substantially more difªcult; subcritical centrifuges avoid these by virtue of being short, and are thus easier to build. Centrifuges of this design were ªrst perfected in the Soviet Union in 1954 and deployed on an industrial scale starting in 1957. 94 Ever since, they have been almost universally pursued as the ªrst centrifuge by research programs. Subcritical machines tend not to garner much attention in the West because the economics of commercial enrichment have pushed Western ªrms to use higher-performance supercritical machines, although subcritical machines are still used in Russia where labor costs remain low. Subcritical centrifuges are nonetheless perfectly adequate for proliferation purposes, and the Soviet Union deployed them exclusively for ªfty-three years in its weapons program. 95 In 1991, subcritical centrifuges made up about 90 percent of the world's centrifuge-enrichment capacity, and as of 2010, subcritical centrifuges still accounted for about 40 percent of the world's total (centrifuge and noncentrifuge) enrichment capacity. 96 It is important to note that the well-known P-1 and P-2 centrifuges marketed by the A.Q. Khan network were early supercritical centrifuges and thus substantially more difªcult to build.
The independent centrifuge programs from the 1960s were based on technologies that a developing country might easily muster today. Even the human resources needed to design the centrifuge-four or so competent mechanical engineers, and six to ten technicians-seem within the reach of most nationstates, no matter how poorly developed or educated the country might be. This does not imply that every state can then build a centrifuge plant. A government's organizational and managerial capabilities are a third critical ingredient, and perhaps the most difªcult for developing countries to muster. 97 Finally, the task of gathering a large numbers of reliable technicians for massproducing centrifuges and subsequently operating the centrifuge plant is a task for which there is unfortunately a paucity of data from which to draw meaningful conclusions. There are some vignettes of what might be possible, however. The United Kingdom brieºy mass-produced centrifuges using com- pletely unskilled labor and hand-operated machine tools. India and Pakistan organized programs and operated plants in the 1970s using only domestic engineers. In contrast, however, the lesser organized and generally less educated Libya did not succeed in organizing a successful effort. Nevertheless, the technology and core engineering requirements do not appear to be serious limitations.
Centrifuge Technology on the Black Market
Pakistan, Iran, Libya, South Africa, North Korea, and Iraq all went to the black market to buy stolen centrifuge technology from private individuals in secret deals. Much of the academic literature implicitly assumes that these countries were forced down this path because they lacked a viable indigenous option. This presumption would seem to be validated by three facts: (1) these states did, indeed, choose black market assistance over indigenous development;
(2) these states were less developed and technologically weak compared to mainstream nuclear powers, and (3) despite the help received, many of these countries experienced long time lines, suggesting they struggled even after receiving help.
Concerning fact (1), a careful reading of history shows that states went to the black market because the offer of assistance was too alluring to pass up, not because they were forced to. In fact, of the six states that received foreign assistance, ªve had indigenous programs or indigenous ambitions-and to the extent that information is known about those programs, they made technology choices that were broadly consistent with the indigenous programs outlined above. Program managers availed themselves of foreign assistance for a mixture of reasons. In all cases, however, offers of assistance were received during formative stages, before any indigenous effort could prove its potential.
Concerning fact (2), that black-market customers have tended to be states with weaker-than-average technological infrastructure does not mean that these states were unable to muster enough ªfty-year-old technology and general engineering expertise to build centrifuges on their own. In fact, the states that went to the black market pursued more difªcult supercritical centrifuges and faced far more signiªcant technological hurdles than they would have experienced had they stayed with a subcritical design.
Concerning fact (3), the long program time lines do not necessarily imply technological ineptitude: effects speciªc to the more difªcult supercritical centrifuges pursued because of black-market assistance, limits on organizational capability, and supply-chain problems associated with black-market providers better explain the long program time lines. Black-market programs were also The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes 63 detected, probably because of their dependence on foreign suppliers, and then subjected to counterproliferation action that caused signiªcant delay.
Not all instances of foreign assistance have been counterproductive. Some states (e.g., Iraq) received well-directed assistance, whereas others (e.g., South Africa) received limited amounts of high-quality information that proved useful later. Most black-market programs, however, have depended on the extended A.Q. Khan network, from which assistance tended to be problematic. This section looks at these programs and their pathologies in detail.
pakistan Prime Minister Zulªka Ali Bhutto authorized Pakistan's centrifuge program in February 1975. 98 Sultan Bashir Mahmood, a nuclear engineer who had participated in a study group on uranium enrichment in 1967, was appointed to head the effort. In a recent interview, Mahmood reports that he had been given a copy of the Zippe report at the inception of the program and set out to build a replica of the simple centrifuge-the same centrifuge built by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. He claims that a prototype was ªnished (but not necessarily tested or proven), and improvements to the design under way, when A.Q. Khan-then living in the Netherlands-began to furnish stolen information about a Dutch centrifuge called "CNOR." 99 Mahmood and his chief scientist, Ghulam Dastagir Alam, began to incorporate CNOR design elements into their prototype-but what Mahmood, Alam, and apparently A.Q. Khan did not realize was that they were poisoning their program: the CNOR design was highly ºawed.
The CNOR was an early attempt by Dutch designers to improve on the basic subcritical centrifuge. They sought to quadruple the performance of their subcritical centrifuge by increasing the length of the centrifuge and rendering it supercritical. Doing so, however, severely complicated the manufacture and operation of the centrifuge. For example, the new CNOR required difªcult-tomanufacture bellows to join rotor segments together. The bellows were made from maraging steel, a material that is hard to come by and hard to work, and it corrodes when exposed to uranium hexaºuoride unless specially treated. The extra weight forced a design change in the lower bearing, from a simple snip of wire to an engineered support using lubricated ball bearing. 100 Most signiªcantly, unlike the subcritical centrifuge, the supercritical CNOR was sus- ceptible to ºexural resonances: vibrational modes that can cause the centrifuge to explode during start-up and shutdown. 101 To guard against these vibrations, the manufacturing tolerances had to be tightened. No longer would a "highschool machine shop" sufªce as it had for subcritical centrifuges-CNOR required high-precision lathes and specialized balancing equipment not generally used in everyday machining. The Dutch overcame many of these hurdles, but despite their best efforts they eventually abandoned the design in April 1973, leaving still imperfect drawings in the archives. 102 It was these unªnished drawings that A.Q. Khan stole for Pakistan, and later sold to Iran and others.
Pakistan's engineers did not have, at this early stage, sufªcient expertise to understand CNOR, the machine tools needed to manufacture it, or knowledge of how to ªx the problems that the Dutch engineers had left unsolved. Eager to improve their humble prototype, they began blindly incorporating some of CNOR's design concepts-but, reportedly, Khan was not even providing enough information to replicate the CNOR properly. According to independent reports by both Mahmood and Alam, the initial information Khan sent by diplomatic pouch consisted of only handmade sketches that lacked detail and accuracy, causing delays and problems. 103 A.Q. Khan returned to Pakistan in December 1975, carrying with him a substantial number of proper CNOR drawings (although still not a complete set). He ºoated on the periphery of the Pakistani centrifuge program until the spring, when, perhaps seeing that his importance was beginning to wane, he started to criticize the foundering program. In April 1976, he organized a coup to take control of the program, and by July he was in charge. 104 According to Alam, the program had ªve technical staff members at the time (not counting Khan or the ousted Mahmood); Khan himself had not yet seen a centrifuge operate, and had no insights to offer about how to make one work. 105 Khan's approach was not to understand how to build centrifuges, but to replicate CNOR by using his contacts in Europe to supply missing design information, equipment, tools, and the prefabricated components that Pakistan could not easily The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes 65 make. In a sense he proposed to buy, not build, a centrifuge for Pakistan. To his superiors, the approach might have seemed a sound way to reduce the risk of failure, but it turned out to be highly vulnerable to foreign interference. In December 1978, for example, Pakistan's third shipment of power inverters from England was frozen after somebody tipped off a British member of Parliament. According to Chief Scientist Alam, this happened because Khan attempted to cheat one of his suppliers, Gotthard Lerch, out of a commission. 106 In turn, the British government sent a démarche to like-minded nations asking them to block shipments of centrifuge-related technology to Pakistan. 107 Soon the denials were extended even to uncontrolled items, as long as the purchaser could be plausibly linked to the centrifuge program. In a personal letter dated July 25, 1979, Khan complained of these interventions: "The Britishers are stalling it more than before. They are even stopping nails and screws. And since we have said Good Bye to the French Ambassador, he is also mad and has stopped our material. 108 We are making the inverters ourselves and hoping that by the end of the year, if God willing, we will make them." 109 This history suggests that Pakistan was on course to build an indigenous, subcritical centrifuge, just as other indigenous programs had, until A.Q. Khan diverted the program to the pursuit of the CNOR supercritical centrifuge. Design ºaws, incomplete information, and tacit-knowledge challenges speciªc to CNOR, as well as counterproliferation efforts aimed at interrupting Pakistan's supply of foreign technology, worked to delay Pakistan's program. Remarkably, Pakistan overcame all of these hurdles; hurdles that were far more demanding than those experienced by programs building subcritical designs.
In the end, Pakistan produced a slightly shorter but still supercritical version of CNOR, which it rebranded the "P-1" around 1981 or 1982. 110 The machine took roughly six years to complete, in contrast to the average two years for indigenous, subcritical-centrifuge programs. Much of that delay can be attrib-International Security 38:4 66 uted to Pakistan's dependence on foreign suppliers, including the delays imposed by counterproliferation action that would have presumably been avoided or postponed if Pakistan had held to the indigenous path begun under Mahmood. For all its efforts, Pakistan stopped producing the P-1 at some point before 1985. 111 The P-1s failed at high rates and performed poorly, not surprising given that many of the fundamental problems of its CNOR lineage remained. In the words of one informed U.S. government ofªcial, the "junk pile was sizeable." 112 Instead of sending the disused machines to the scrap heap, however, Khan found a new use for them: he sold them to unwitting nations such as Libya and Iran.
iran According to Iran's declarations to the IAEA, the decision to launch a centrifuge program was taken in 1985. Iran later received centrifuge drawings from A.Q. Khan's associates around 1987. 113 One of the early heads of Iran's program, Masud Naraghi, relates in an interview that Iran had initiated a research program well before any offer of foreign assistance. He reports that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had planned to build a centrifuge indigenously, and had hired an Iranian-American consultant, but the consultant quit after approximately six months because he was unable to locate any centrifugerelated papers in Iran's meager libraries. Iran lacked access to basic scientiªc journals at that time, in part because of sanctions imposed by the West. 114 Naraghi became the ªrst regular staff member of the Atomic Energy Organization to head the centrifuge program. He says he was appointed before Iran's interaction with the A.Q. Khan network and was simultaneously heading a number of other projects. The centrifuge project was not a priority for him. He believes, based on his interactions with Khan's associates during this time, that the network was connected at a high level to Iran's state-operated technical establishments and had become aware of Iran's interest in uranium enrichment. In early 1987, a handwritten offer was presented to Naraghi's manager, Reza Amrollahi, who proposed a decision to buy. This course of action was endorsed by Iran's prime minister, and probably also by the supreme leader. 115 Amrollahi did not, however, choose to buy everything that was offered, which included parts sufªcient to assemble 2,000 centrifuges and essentially all the auxiliary equipment needed to run a centrifuge plant-some of which were likely scrap parts from Pakistan's centrifuge program. Instead, he chose to buy only the engineering drawings and sample components, with the intention of making the centrifuges indigenously-an action that speaks to his conªdence in Iran's domestic capabilities.
The drawings Iran received were for the P-1 that Pakistan had abandoned at least three years earlier. At minimum, Pakistan was selling Iran a centrifuge that it regarded as inferior and outmoded; at worst, Khan was intentionally cheating Iran. In a possible conªrmation of the latter, Naraghi reports that when the drawings were delivered, he found them woefully inadequate: "Drawings we received were very incomplete. For something like this one should get a complete assembly drawing, with parts numbered, and then drawings for each part separately. There was an assembly drawing with parts numbered, but not complete drawings of parts, which were more than one hundred. Instead, there were multiple drawings of the same part, and these appeared to be rejected drawings, perhaps collected from a wastebasket. No tolerances. In addition we were supposed to receive one sample of all the parts separately, a complete [set of] parts for one P1. And we never received even half of those promised parts during the time I was with the project." 116 A month after Pakistan's president granted A.Q. Khan clemency, Khan wrote a still-unpublished statement to Simon Henderson of the London Times. The letter is of dubious veracity in that it appears Khan is attempting to clear his name, but at least one part is consistent with Naraghi's claim: "Under pressure, Gen. Imtiaz asked Dr. Hashmi (I was out of station) to give some centrifuge parts and drawings etc. to the Iranians. He (Hashmi) asked him to wait until my return. When I got back, Gen. Imtiaz advised me to get components of two old (P-1) discarded machines and pack them into boxes together with 2 sets of drawings prepared by the late Mr. Khokhar. These drawings on their own were not sufªciently detailed to enable mastery of this difªcult tech- nology. . . . Furthermore, the components were old, mostly rejected due to being out-of-tolerances." 117 Both supplier and buyer agree that the drawings and parts transferred were inadequate for the task of replicating the P-1 centrifuge. According to both Naraghi and Iran's communications with the IAEA, Iran worked independently for six years without any additional outside assistance. 118 A small team of three researchers at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran attempted to replicate the P-1 centrifuge using what Khan had provided but were unsuccessful. Naraghi says his team was unable to assemble even a single working centrifuge, and that he had lost all motivation to work on the project because of the hopeless situation. Demoralized, Naraghi left the program in 1989 and, at least initially, it appeared that A.Q. Khan's claim was correct-the information provided was insufªcient for Iran to re-create the P-1. Even if it had been sufªcient, fundamental problems inherent in the supercritical P-1 design remained unseen.
Amrollahi continued to insist his investment in P-1 technology be made to work, and when Naraghi left, Hormuz Azodi replaced him and the program continued. Azodi worked fruitlessly on the P-1 for several more years, complaining to the Khan network that he needed further information-and soon luck befell the Iranians. The Khan network had separately agreed to sell Libya a complete set of components for a proliferation-scale centrifuge plant in a deal struck in 1989. In 1991, Libya refused to pay for those components, citing an inability to access funds as a consequence of sanctions resulting from its having bombed Pan Am ºight 103. 119 Khan's subcontractors were reportedly furious that they had not been paid, forcing Khan to look for alternative buyers. 120 At least one offer went to Iraq, which declined to buy. Eventually the The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes 69 network reconnected with Iran and, in 1993, the two parties reached an agreement that rescued Iran's program from stagnation. Iran would buy what Libya could not, including difªcult-to-make parts for 500 P-1 centrifuges. The network sweetened the deal by providing, among other things, a more complete set of drawings for the P-1 and P-2 centrifuges. Deliveries of parts were slow to arrive. They came in two shipments, one in March 1994 and the second in July 1996, adding two more years to Iran's already protracted time line. Then one type of component, the bellows, proved to be of poor quality (being discarded parts from Pakistan's scrapheap). Iran had to wait for a replacement delivery, which did not arrive until 1997. 121 Eventually, after thirteen additional meetings with the Khan network, theoretical studies done with the help of Iran's universities, and further modiªcations to the design, Iran was ªnally able to master a modiªed version of the P-1 centrifuge by the end of the 1990s. 122 In total, Iran's interactions with foreign suppliers, from the six years of futile work to the constant waiting, add up to approximately a full decade of imposed delay.
U.S. intelligence detected Iran's program at some point prior to 1991. 123 It seems plausible that the United States and its partners worked to interdict or sabotage shipments of centrifuge-related materials going into Iran's program starting at this time, just as they had done with Pakistan's program, thereby inducing further setbacks in Iran's time line. 124 Despite all of these hurdles, Iran's engineers were able to master the supercritical CNOR/P-1 design. It seems likely, however, that had Iran avoided foreign assistance, it could have mastered a simple subcritical centrifuge far more quickly, and without foreign interference. For all its efforts, Iran did not end up in a better position: Iran's version of the P-1, which it calls the IR-1, performs at about 0.6-1. Libya's second attempt at buying a centrifuge program overlapped with its ªrst. In January 1984, the Khan network offered to sell Libya a centrifuge program, which Libya initially rejected. 128 In the fall of 1989, Libya reconnected with Khan and agreed to purchase a package of centrifuge drawings and components, which its engineers-or perhaps Stache-would assemble. When Khan's associates were ready to make the delivery, Libya refused to pay for the entire order, buying only blueprints related to the CNOR/P-1 design. 129 According to senior IAEA ofªcials, this disagreement resulted in the sale of the balance of the goods to Iran, which ultimately rescued the Iranian program. Libya and Stache made little progress with the P-1 drawings. In 1995, after Stache had been let go, Libya returned twice more to the Khan network, the ªrst time ordering fully assembled centrifuges, and later a full-scale centrifuge plant. 130 Libya's program suffered from several problems. First, it remains unclear whether the country ever had the organizational capacity to build an indigenous program of any kind, or even to operate the turnkey plant that it eventually ordered from the Khan network. Testifying to its disorganization, a set of specialized machine tools bought for the indigenous fabrication of centrifuges sat in crates for years and were never unpacked. 131 The uranium conversion facility bought from Japan remained crated for two years, then was partially assembled, then was moved to another site, but was never completed or operated. 132 In addition, Libya suffered from internal security problems (or paranoia) that impeded progress. On several occasions, Libyan authorities ordered that centrifuge-related equipment be relocated to new sites. 133 The outcomes of Libya's interactions with the black market were mixed at best. Stache duped Libya for a decade. Later, the Khan network stepped up to save Libya's centrifuge program, but it was the Khan network that also led to the early termination of the program. Libya's dealings with the network were detected by U.S. intelligence around the year 2000, after Libya had placed the order for a fullscale centrifuge plant. Components being made abroad were monitored, sabotaged, and eventually seized by the United States in October 2003. 134 Under intense diplomatic pressure from the British and U.S. governments, and with essentially no viable prospect of completing its program, Libya surrendered its nuclear pursuits in December 2003. Although it cannot be said that Libya had the potential to make centrifuges on its own, it is equally evident that the black market did not serve Libya well.
conclusions on the role of foreign assistance Not every case of foreign assistance has been counterproductive. The United States, Germany, and the Netherlands all received valuable assistance from Gernot Zippe. 135 South Africa and Iraq also received high-quality information from Germans. North Korea initially received limited information about P-1s from Pakistan, but later obtained signiªcant assistance based on the more reliable P-2 centrifuge after establishing strong military relations. In sum, foreign assistance is unreliable, sometimes productive, and sometimes extremely problematic-but rarely necessary.
If subcritical centrifuges are easy to build and adequate for proliferation, why did proliferators not simply pursue small, subcritical centrifuges instead of risking dependence on foreign entities? In the broadest possible sense, most states did take that approach: thirteen of twenty centrifuge programs were fully indigenous, and many of those programs were started with proliferation or latent-proliferation intent. Furthermore, of the seven that received some foreign assistance, at least three (Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq) had indigenous programs ªrst, making sixteen of twenty that pursued indigenous programs at the outset of their efforts. Too little is known about the early histories of North Korea's, India's, and South Africa's centrifuge programs to make a judgment. Only one program, Libya's, can be said with certainty to have been fully dependent on foreign assistance from the outset. This suggests that states are not shy about pursuing indigenous programs, and absent an offer of foreign assistance, most states would likely continue down that reliable path. The nonproliferation community should not believe that the absence of a black market will signiªcantly restrain proliferation.
Finally, there remains the question of why states pursuing indigenous programs switched to foreign assistance. With only three cases, and without detailed knowledge of the decisionmaking in those states, there is too little data to draw reliable conclusions, but there is enough information to speculate. In Pakistan's case, it appears that the leadership either doubted national abilities or was greedy and wanted to move quickly to a European centrifuge design. In Iraq's case, the program was urgent, as Iraq was immersed in conºict and wanted a nuclear deterrent. According to the program's technical director, the political overseer of the program, Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid, was threatening to take the lives of the engineers if they did not make more rapid progress. 136 Engineers responded to this pressure by soliciting foreign assistance. Finally, in Iran's case there was a personal relationship between A.Q. Khan-network salesman Gotthard Lerch and head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Reza Amrollahi. This, perhaps coupled with a sense of self-doubt arising from the earlier, abortive attempt with the Iranian-American consultant, seems to have motivated the decision to buy the P-1 design. In all cases, there appears to have been an element of self-doubt combined with ex- tenuating circumstances such as sanctions, imminent conºict, or nepotism that interfered with better decisionmaking.
Bringing all strands of evidence together, I conclude that technology has rarely been the limiting factor for the acquisition of centrifuges. Several highly visible programs made it appear as though centrifuges were a difªcult challenge, but these problems actually reºect challenges uniquely associated with the ºawed CNOR/P-1/IR-1 design, not a general challenge of centrifuges. In nearly all cases, organizational capacity or managerial competence has been the true limiting factor.
If this assessment is correct, then policymakers should question the ultimate utility of technology controls. The historical record indicates that these controls have been valuable in detecting programs that were critically reliant on export-controlled technologies (e.g., Pakistan), but consistent with the 2005 intelligence commission's conclusions, these instances were anomalies linked to A.Q. Khan and are not likely to be repeated. Export controls have also slowed programs, sometimes meaningfully (e.g., Iran and Libya), but this was only possible because the CNOR (and the derivative P-1 and IR-1 centrifuges) required exotic tools, materials, and expertise not domestically available. The larger history of centrifuge proliferation stands in stark contrast. States built centrifuges that did not rely on controlled technologies, 137 and were organized in ways that seem able to escape detection and intervention.
Conclusion
From the earliest days of the nuclear age, before Hiroshima, even before Trinity, views on how to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons were divided over the role of technology. Nuclear weapon advocates, such as Winston Churchill and Leslie Groves, believed that other leaders would also see nuclear weapons as essential, and therefore could not be persuaded to forgo these advantages by normative arguments. It was therefore compulsory for the U.S.-U.K. alliance to maintain control over the scientiªc information, industrial tools, and uranium deposits needed to make the bomb. By 1945, the obsession with technology had become so great that Groves instituted secrecy rules preventing even the United Kingdom, the progenitor of the Manhattan
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Project, from accessing U.S. nuclear information. 138 Groves also sought to secure exclusive rights to all the uranium deposits known in the Western world. 139 In keeping with this approach, the U.S. Congress passed the MacMahon Act in 1946, strictly limiting nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, including the closest of allies. Although President Truman and members of his cabinet were more skeptical of the secrecy effort, they eventually put their faith in a similar technology-based logic: for them, the Manhattan Project was the greatest industrial project in human history, and given that the United States was now the world's most capable industrial power and had gathered many of the ªnest minds from Europe, they felt it was, in Truman's words, "doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world." 140 At the same time, a group of concerned Manhattan Project scientists, each with a deep understanding of international competence in scientiªc research, came to the opposite conclusion. Individuals such as Niels Bohr, Robert Oppenheimer, Glenn Seaborg, and Leo Szilard acknowledged that technology posed a temporary hurdle, but argued that there was no enduring security in its control. Any advantage, according to their experience, would be ephemeral. They wrote, "Even if we can retain our leadership in basic knowledge of nucleonics for a certain time by maintaining the secrecy of all results achieved on this and associated Projects, it would be foolish to hope that this can protect us for more than a few years." Enduring protection, they concluded, "can only come from the political organization of the world." 141 In a sense, both views were correct. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the industrial requirements of producing ªssile materials were still far beyond the reach of most states. For this reason-and because the American political elite found it easier to put its faith in technological hurdles than to sort out the political difªculties of nuclear abolition-the supply-side approach prevailed. 142 Even
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if the United States could not maintain its nuclear monopoly, it would at least have a head start in the arms race.
In 1946, few if any could have imagined the dramatic effects technological change would bring. At the time, the prevailing image of uranium enrichment was the gaseous-diffusion plant built at Oak Ridge: a facility of such enormous scale that it employed at its wartime peak some 12,000 people, enclosed fortyfour acres under a single roof, and by 1945 consumed nearly three times the electricity of the heavily industrialized city of Detroit. 143 By the 1960s, the enrichment challenge had changed completely. Using centrifuges, a handful of engineers and a few dozen technicians could build a plant capable of enriching uranium for one bomb per year. It would ªt in a high-school cafeteria, and could be powered by a single diesel generator. In 2014, such a centrifuge plant might be had for as little as $20 million. 144 The history of centrifuge proliferation bears out the warning of the Manhattan Project scientists. Technological developments and industrial evolution have moved the proliferation-potential frontier to the point where nearly any country can independently build an enrichment program and thereby produce highly enriched uranium. The required information has long been in the public domain: many of the indigenous programs cited in this article were started in the mid-1960s when the only available information was the U.S.-published Zippe reports. Since then, hundreds of additional technical publications have appeared, which can be easily found using digital catalogs available via the internet. The 1950s' era tools and equipment needed to build centrifuges are also modest, if not rudimentary, by modern standards. Few to none of the components or materials are esoteric enough to be effectively controlled, and a ªrst-generation subcritical centrifuge does not require any currently controlled items. Organizational capacity is perhaps the only meaningful supply-side barrier to the fabrication of simple centrifuges; yet history suggests that all but the weakest states (e.g., Libya) have been able to organize themselves well enough to get the job done.
Building a bomb requires more than enriching uranium, but the additional steps, which include the mining of uranium, the production of uranium hexaºuoride, the post-enrichment conversion of the uranium hexaºuoride to uranium metal, and ªnally the fabrication of bomb components, are simple in comparison to building subcritical centrifuges. These steps also require organizational capacity and specialized knowledge, but here too the knowledge needed is neither secret nor obscure, and these steps require little in the way of specialized materials or equipment. A state's ability to carry out these additional steps is also, therefore, largely independent of technology controls. 145 This is not to say that technology controls are completely without merit. Such controls may make the task of building and operating centrifuges more arduous by forcing states to build more of the required technology indigenously and to spend more time troubleshooting the challenges that will inevitably arise. Supply-side controls may also limit the ability of states to build high-performance centrifuges, which would increase the overall effort required to build a centrifuge plant of any given size, and would also limit the ability of states to make credible claims that their primitive centrifuges are part of a peaceful, commercial program should their efforts be detected. Finally, supply-side controls will continue to provide barriers to noncentrifuge modes of nuclear proliferation. Such controls should not be eliminated, but it must be recognized that these institutions are increasingly outmoded. They cannot restrict the indigenous centrifuge route described herein, and will not, therefore, eliminate a state's fundamental ability to build nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation governments should, therefore, reconsider how they apportion their efforts between supply-side and demand-side approaches.
Finally, it should be understood that this article has not described a novel proliferation strategy. The problem of centrifuge proliferation is already widespread and well established. Over the past thirty-ªve years, seven of eight states seeking nuclear weapons have pursued centrifuges; most made centrifuges the primary focus of their programs; and every indigenous program started with basic, subcritical centrifuges such as those described here. Even states that ultimately pursued black-market assistance started with indigenous programs. There is no evidence to suggest that states doubted their domestic capabilities enough to be deterred from pursuing centrifuges altogether, or that they failed to choose the right kind of centrifuge when they did. It seems the optimal path is already the path most states selected, and all else equal, future states will probably continue this trend. There is nothing novel about the centrifuge problem; it is only that the policy community puts its focus elsewhere.
A possible explanation for why the policy community failed to address this
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145. This is especially true for gun-type devices; see note 15. This is also true for the delivery of a device. Although missile and aircraft delivery systems pose a greater technical challenge, as of 2014 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has not identiªed a way to detect highly enriched uranium weapons smuggled in commercial shipping containers.
problem when it ªrst emerged can be found in the archives of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. As demonstrated earlier, the U.S. government knew about the problem since 1959, warned the public in 1960, and pursued conªrmatory studies between 1960 and 1966. Despite the outcome of these studies, the government did not waver in its predilection for technology controls. A careful reading of AEC Chairman McCone's papers suggests that the AEC acted to bury these ªndings, both within the executive branch and beyond, by publicly obfuscating the extent of the problem and withholding information from the U.S. Congress, while privately it worried increasingly about centrifuges and attempted to make information pertaining to them more and more secret. Fifty years and at least ªfteen indigenous centrifuge programs later, however, it is evident that secrecy and denial is not a lasting solution. 146 It is only by chance of history that the centrifuge has become the premier example of a largely uncontrollable proliferation technology. It is not likely to be the last. Laser enrichment, and perhaps other still-undiscovered or unperfected technologies, may pose similar challenges for the technology-control regime. None of the foregoing suggests, however, that there will be a sudden outbreak of proliferation. To the contrary, this article describes a situation that has prevailed for decades without rampant proliferation. Apparently, states seeking a nuclear weapon capability do not necessarily seek to build nuclear weapons. The lack of proliferation in these cases cannot be attributed to technological barriers-motivations must have been key. While the speciªc causes of proliferation abstinence lie beyond the scope of this article, the subject clearly merits deeper analysis by both policymakers and academics, as such factors are probably the most viable basis for the future of the nonproliferation regime. 
